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Abstract 
Procyclicality is an inherent feature of the real and especially the financial sector of an 
economy, which has been highlighted by the recent crisis. Due to procyclicality, banks 
are transformed from mitigation mechanisms to amplifiers of changes in economic 
activity potentially affecting financial stability. The causes of procyclicality can be 
attributed to market imperfections and deviations from the efficient market hypothesis, 
while other factors -including Basel II and accounting standards- may have exacerbated 
it. To attenuate procyclicality, a number of suggestions have been made in the form of 
rules and discretion and are presented according to the factors they aim to alleviate. Some 
of the suggestions have been adopted under the Basel III framework, including the 
countercyclical capital buffer. Although these Basel III proposals seem able to address 
the procyclicality issue, they will lead to higher minimum capital adequacy ratios, which 
are expected to increase lending costs and the provision of loans by banks, and reduce 
economic activity. However, the cost of the new proposals is expected to be lower than 
the estimated cost of financial crisis. 
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The long history of economic and financial crises shows that procyclicality is an 
inherent feature of the real and especially the financial sector of an economy. In 
particular, the recent crisis has been characterized by intense procyclicality of the banking 
sector and its link with the real sector in a mutually reinforcing manner that may lead to a 
vicious circle.
The main feature of procyclicality is an underestimation or overestimation of the 
risks to which the banking sector is exposed, which leads to relatively high growth during 
the upward phase of the cycle, while downturns are characterised by strong risk aversion, 
that constrain the supply of loans due to banks’ concerns about loan portfolio quality and 
the probability of default. Thus, the banking industry changes from an effective 
mechanism for allocating funds to a mechanism that exacerbates cyclical fluctuations, 
hindering the efficient allocation of resources in the economy and adversely affecting 
credit growth and financial stability. 
The literature, both theoretical and empirical, has attempted to explain this 
behaviour. Keynes (1936) and later Minsky (1982) argue that the way in which financial 
markets function is erratic, because they are based largely on developments which are 
surrounded by uncertainty and are usually characterized by asymmetric behaviour. In 
general, factors contributing to the banking industry’s procyclicality are economic policy, 
the economic and financial environment and the regulatory framework of banks (e.g. 
Caprio, 2010 and Hardouvelis, 2010). Factors such as Basel I and II, accounting rules, 
credit rating agencies’ reports and the use of similar risk management systems have been 
criticized for they did not help to control procyclicality in the banking sector, but instead 
reinforced it (Kashyap and Stein, 2004, Jokipii and Milne, 2008 and Enria et al., 2004). 
More precisely, these studies found that capital requirements may lead to procyclical 
behaviour, reducing the supply of loans by banks particularly in times of recession, when 
liquidity in the real sector of the economy is usually limited. Since many companies have 
no alternative funding source, the reduced supply of loans leads to a significant decline in 
economic activity. Even by the end of 2008, the G-20 agreed on the need to deal with the 
procyclicality issue and called upon the IMF, the Financial Stability Board and the Basel 
  5Committee to find ways to alleviate it. Note that the new proposals of Basel III include 
countercyclical capital buffers, which imply that the regulators do attempt to alleviate the 
procyclical behaviour of Basel II. However, while there is broad agreement on the causes 
and effects of procyclicality, little progress has been made in finding ways to mitigate it. 
Prudential regulation, monetary and fiscal policies seem to be a powerful tool in this 
respect.
The purpose of this paper is to study banking sector procyclicality. We explore the 
issues of the concept and the different definitions of the term "procyclicality" and clarify 
the main causes that make procyclicality inherent to the financial sector and the factors 
that exacerbate or mitigate it. We analyze the procyclical supply of and demand for bank 
loans and their relationship to economic activity (financial accelerator), as well as the 
interaction of economic and regulatory capital. We discuss the procyclical behaviour of 
Basel II and accounting rules and its implications. We also review a variety of proposals 
that address the procyclicality issue as far as Basel II, accounting rules, leverage and 
liquidity are concerned. Finally, we present the proposals of Basel III and their estimated 
effects on economic activity, the cost of borrowing and private sector financing. 
This paper aims at a comprehensive, exploratory and possibly concise, although not 
exhaustive, overview of the existing literature on procyclicality, exploring some aspects 
of the procyclicality that have not been addressed until recently in the relevant literature. 
The paper focuses on the following main directions: Firstly, it classifies and presents 
comprehensively existing knowledge on several aspects of procyclicality, especially 
those concerning its causes, its consequences and the proposals to mitigate it. Secondly, it 
clarifies the relevant concepts, which are referred to in the literature, but are not 
adequately explained and therefore may not be used by all researchers in the same way. 
Thirdly, it critically examines the propositions concerning the banking sector’s 
procyclicality issue. 
However, some issues are deliberately not elaborated in this paper. For example, 
the findings presented are based on studies concerning a variety of countries, but the 
differences across countries are not always explained. Likewise, the role of public debt 
  6markets and credit default swaps are not dealt with, while the effect of corporate 
governance on compensation schemes is only narrowly explained. 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we define the concept of banking 
sector procyclicality. In Section 3, we analyze the procyclical demand and supply of 
loans and the role of the financial accelerator. In Section 4, we show the relationship 
between procyclicality and profitability. In Sections 5 and 6, we discuss the consequences 
and causes of procyclicality, respectively. The causes of procyclicality are further divided 
into those that make procyclicality inherent to the financial system and those that enhance 
or mitigate it. In Sections 7 and 8, we consider the contribution of Basel II and 
accounting standards to the increase in banking sector procyclicality. The international 
literature has presented a number of proposals to mitigate procyclicality, some of which 
are referred to in Section 9. In Section 10, we set out the decisions reached by the Basel 
Committee in September 2010, concerning procyclicality in the banking sector, and the 
potential impact of these decisions. Finally, in Section 11 we report the main findings of 
this study.
2. Procyclicality in the banking sector:  concept and definition 
It is widely acknowledged that bank lending is cyclical, i.e. banks respond to 
changing economic activity
1. Specifically, during downturns, banks limit credit supply. 
At the same time, during such phases, demand for new credit is weak, because there are 
limited alternative investment proposals with positive net present values (Berlin, 2009). 
In other words, a simultaneous decline in both the supply and the demand for credit can 
be observed. In a severe crisis like the recent one, the decline in the supply of loans, at 
least initially, is greater than the decrease in demand, as loan applications for investments 
with positive net present value tend to be rejected following a significant increase in the 
risk premium, reflecting increased risk aversion.
Procyclicality can be alternatively defined as: 
                                                 
1 See Gambera (2000) for American, Salas and Saurina (2002) for Spanish and Pain (2003) for 
British banks. 
  7•  The reinforcing interaction within the financial sector and between the financial 
sector and the real economy, leading to unsustainable economic growth during in 
upturns and deep recession
2 in downturns (BIS, 2010 and Clement, 2010). 
•  The tendency of banks to significantly ease their lending standards in the upturns and 
stiffen them in downturns
3. 
•  All banking practices that reinforce the current phase of the economic cycle. 
•  The mechanism by which the business cycle, the financial cycle and the cycle of risk-
taking behaviour represented by fluctuations in asset prices move simultaneously in 
the same direction (Nijathawon, 2009). These three cycles are mutually-reinforcing 
and interact with each other. 
Procyclicality of credit standards is associated with the banks’ assets, capital 
adequacy and capital structure, willingness to take risks, profitability, as well as other 
factors such as risk assessment and risk management practices and the functioning of 
money markets. 
 
3. Procyclicality in the demand and the supply of bank loans 
Several studies have examined the behaviour of loan demand and supply during 
various phases of the economic cycle. The behaviour of loan demand on the part of 
firms has been examined by Jimenez et al. (2007), who find that during recession firms 
have higher financial needs
4. Moreover, Jimenez et al. (2010) and Albetrazzi and 
                                                 
2 This is the definition of procyclicality from the macroprudential supervisor’s point of view. 
Macroprudential supervision considers the change in risk over the economic cycle, and how risks 
are distributed within the financial system. 
3 The change in bank credit standards is associated with the credit risk. This risk is overstated 
(understated) in the downward (upward) phase of the cycle and therefore the interest margin 
charged is higher (lower) than would result given the "actual" level of risk that this loan 
incorporates. In particular, during the downward phase of the cycle, rising interest rates (due to 
the increased risk premium) may cause the net present value of an investment to negative and 
lead to the rejection of the loan requested. ECB (2009c) notes that the tightening of bank credit 
standards for loans from mid-2007 onwards is mainly depicted in a rise in interest rate margins.
4  The study found that companies a year before their bankruptcy increase their (median) rate of 
use of their credit lines to 71% versus 43% for firms that did not go bankrupt. As bankruptcies 
tend to increase when GDP falls, it is likely that part of the increased use of credit lines can be 
attributed to firms that went bankrupt afterwards. 
  8Marchetti (2010) have found for Spain and Italy respectively, that during tight economic 
and monetary conditions, firms with a weak financial position may not be able to have 
access to adequate bank credit. This fact may be enhanced by a “flight to quality” 
tendency by banks (see Albetrazzi and Marchetti, 2010 and Bernanke et al., 1996), but 
may also be attenuated because of “evergreening
5” strategies - especially by smaller 
banks (Albetrazzi and Marchetti, 2010) and by relationship lending (Puri et al., 2010). 
Borrowers’ cash flows and net worth (the latter can be used as collateral) tend to 
decline during worsening economic conditions, elevating their probability of default and 
consequently their premium of external finance, and their ability to have access to credit 
is hampered. This leads to a reduction in spending, investment and output, creating an 
accelerating feedback loop between the level of economic activity and credit institutions. 
The opposite occurs during improving economic conditions. Bernanke et al. (1989) name 
this loop as the financial accelerator, which refers to the fact that even relatively small 
shocks to the economy may be amplified by endogenous changes in credit market 
conditions and lead to the propagation of the business cycle (see Kiyotaki and Moore, 
1997, Bernanke et al., 1998 and Bernanke, 2007). The financial accelerator is rationalized 
theoretically within the asymmetric information and principal – agent theory framework 
(i.e. market frictions). An implication of this framework is that borrowers with relatively 
high agency costs are expected to be more severely hit by worsening economic conditions 
and be forced to reduce their economic activities more than other borrowers, since they 
will face more difficulties in accessing credit (flight to quality, Bernanke et al., 1996). 
Christiano et al. (2010) add to the financial accelerator analysis a “Fisher deflation” 
effect, which interacts with the former and exacerbates the business cycle reaction, when 
the price level and output move in the same direction. 
Loan supply is determined by a number of factors, most important of which are 
bank capital, economic activity and the level of competition. As regards procyclicality, 
the contribution of bank capital
6 and economic activity are of particular importance. 
                                                 
5 I.e. lending more money to firms in distress so that the latter do not default.  
6 It refers both to economic as well as regulatory capital. Regarding the former, it has been found 
that banks actively manage their capital structure (Gropp and Heider, 2009 and Berger et al., 
2008), while Berrospide and Edge (2010) have the opposite view. Regarding regulatory capital, a 
number of studies in various countries have shown that capital adequacy rules tend to restrict 
  9Changes in a bank’s capital may cause changes in its loan supply, even if there is no 
change in the net present value of these loans. This fact is reported by a number of 
empirical studies such as Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Furfine (2000) for U.S. banks
7, 
and Jimenez et al. (2010), Albetrazzi and Marchetti (2010) and Puri et al. (2010) for 
Spanish, Italian and German banks, respectively
8. As regards capital buffers
9 Marcucci 
and Quagliariello (2008) report that Italian banks reduced their loan supply during the 
period 1990-2004, because their capital buffers dropped, which negatively affected GDP, 
while the findings for UK banks are similar (Francis and Osborne, 2009). 
Moreover, it has been found that bank credit standards
10 are influenced by the 
economic cycle. Specifically: 
•  In the U.S.
 11, banks change their bank credit standards depending on the current 
phase of the economic cycle, even after taking into account loan demand. Similar 
findings apply to European banks for the 2003-2009 period (Hempell and Sorensen, 
2010). 
•  High GDP growth is accompanied by softer bank credit standards, increased loan 
amounts and maturities (ECB, 2009a), as well as by reduced collateral requirements 
(Jimenez and Saurina, 2006). 
                                                                                                                                                   
bank lending (Bernanke and Lown, 1991, Berger and Udell, 1994, Peek and Rosengren, 1995). 
An exception to this is Bikker and Hu, 2001 (see also Sections 6.2 and 9.2.1). 
7  Berrospide and Edge (2010) find that U.S. banks’ level of capital affects private sector 
financing, to a lesser extent than economic activity and banks’ risk appetite. 
8 Jimenez et al. (2010), Albetrazzi and Marchetti (2010) and Puri et al. (2010) concluded that low 
capital combined with low liquidity reduces loan supply during a period of falling economic 
activity. However, during expansion, banks with lower capital and liquidity ratios are more likely 
to approve a loan (Jimenez et al., 2010). 
9 The capital buffer is defined as the difference between a bank's total risk-adjusted capital and its 
minimum capital requirements. 
10 Changes in bank lending standards during the economic cycle are reflected in total financing, 
the cost of borrowing (loan interest rate and other charges, Asea and Blomberg, 1998, Bliss and 
Kaufman, 2002, Jimenez and Saurina, 2006, Cappiello et al., 2010 and Bernanke and Lown, 
1991), the amount of collateral required (Jimenez and Saurina, 2006 and Section 6.2.2 for the 
analysis concerning the role of collateral in banking industry procyclicality) and maturity (Gordy 
and Howells, 2006). 
11 This is a survey, conducted by the Federal Reserve, about the credit practices of large banks, 
reported in Berger et al. (2008) and Hardouvelis (2010).
 
  10•  In Greece, the decline in GDP during the last quarter of 2009 was accompanied by 
more stringent bank credit standards and higher rejection rates for SMEs, despite a 
steady business loan demand (Bank of Greece, 2010b). 
Regarding the relationship between loan supply and economic activity, it has been 
shown that loan supply is an important determinant of economic activity (e.g. Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1989, Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 and Diamond and Rajan, 2005). However, 
it is not easy to explain the procyclicality of bank loans, since this may reflect changes in 
both loan supply and demand. Kashyap et al. (1993) find that in the U.S. during the 1964-
1989 period, the loan supply decline contributed to the GDP decline. On the other hand, 
there are indications that the decline in economic activity during the 1980-2009 period in 
the G-7 reflected falling loan demand rather than supply (De Nicolo and Lucchetta, 
2010). The effect of loan supply on economic activity depends on various factors such as 
the size of the interest rate increase and the proportion of economic activity financed by 
banks
12 (Bernanke and Lown, 1991). For this reason, the effect of capital on bank supply 
is much higher for countries where bank lending is more important for economic activity 
than in the U.S. (Berrospide and Edge, 2010). 
 
4. Profitability and procyclicality 
The empirical literature has shown that bank profitability is characterized by 
procyclical behaviour. Economic activity affects interest income (through loan supply to 
the private sector, Jimenez et al., 2009) and provisions (through the quality of banks’ 
assets
13). Structural factors (e.g. the level of competition, customer-bank relationship, 
capital market development etc.) are important determinants of profitability over the 
business cycle. Therefore, it is interesting to know if the structure of the financial system 
contributes to the procyclicality. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and Bikker and Hu 
                                                 
12 For example, in the U.S. (where the total bank loans to the private sector to GDP ratio stood at 
63% in 2007) during the period 1965-2004 the amount and cost of bank financing did not have a 
substantial impact on economic activity (Driscoll, 2004). In contrast, for the euro area (where the 
relevant figure is much higher), Cappiello et al. (2010) found that during the period 1999-2008 
loan supply had a positive impact on economic activity. 
13 See Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Lucas and Saurina (2002).  
  11(2001) found a positive relationship between GDP and bank profitability, although the 
variables used (GDP growth and per capita income) are not good proxies of the cycle. 
Athanasoglou et al. (2008), using deviations from the trend in real GDP of Greece for the 
period 1985-2001, concluded that the cycle affects Greek banks’ profitability, even after 
taking into account factors that are directly associated with it, such as losses from bad 
debts, provisions to cover credit risk and market structure. 
Banks profitability’s procyclicality can be explained (Athanasoglou et al., 2008) by 
the following factors: 
In periods of GDP growth, bank loan demand grows, which leads to an increase in 
bank profits. Furthermore, GDP growth usually leads to higher stock market prices, 
which also affects positively banks’ profitability, due to increased transaction fee income 
and capital gains. Finally, banks may, depending on competitive conditions, increase their 
interest rate margins. 
Conversely, profitability declines during recessions, due to increased provisions 
and bad debts and reduced loan demand and supply. In addition, if the cause of a 
recession is a financial crisis like the recent one, then banks may face higher funding 
costs due to increased systemic risk. 
Procyclicality of a bank’s profitability is transmitted through the bank capital 
channel, mainly because of the borrowers’ inability to meet their debt obligations. 
Specifically, when the economy is in recession, banks’ profits decline, and if a capital 
increase by issuing new shares is not feasible, banks may be forced to reduce their 
lending in order to maintain their capital adequacy. This reduction of lending leads to a 
further decline in economic activity. 
 
5. The impact of procyclicality 
Procyclicality in banking is in the limelight due to this industry’s significant 
influence on economic activity and its role in the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. Additionally, procyclicality affects banks’ profitability and consequently banks’ 
capital adequacy ratios, which in turn can threaten the solvency of banking institutions 
  12and therefore financial stability. In particular, procyclicality can cause significant 
problems to the efficient functioning of banks
14 in the following areas: 
•  In transforming the banking system from a mitigation mechanism to a reinforcing 
mechanism of the economic cycle. The banking system should provide a safety net to 
enterprises and households, in order to mitigate volatility in economic activity. 
However, as noted above, due to procyclicality, banks usually finance risky 
investments with marginally positive or even negative net present value in the 
upturns, while they do the opposite in the downturns. In that way, the banking system, 
rather than compensating for swings in economic activity over the cycle, makes them 
even more intense. 
•  Proper allocation of resources. Specifically, during the upward phase of the cycle, 
because of a softening in bank lending standards, increased competition and the 
underestimation of risk
15, loans are granted to investments with marginally positive or 
even negative net present value, while during the downturns, even investments with 
positive net present value do not receive bank financing. Indeed, it has been shown 
that loans approved in the upward phase of the cycle exhibit a higher probability of 
default (Jimenez and Saurina, 2006). 
•  Stakeholders’ and especially supervisors’ ability to control banks’ management. This 
stems from the fact that problem loans tend to emerge with a lag (Berger and Udell, 
2002). 
 
6. Causes of procyclicality 
6.1 Procyclicality and deviations from the efficient market hypothesis 
In order to address the consequences of procyclicality effectively, we must first 
understand the factors that cause and / or enhance it. Banks' procyclical behaviour can be 
                                                 
14 For example, financial system volatility may be positive if it leads to long-term growth. 
According to the same rationale, procyclicality in the banking industry may be desirable, if it is 
solely the outcome of changes in the real economy, while it is not desirable if it is caused by the 
financial system itself (Landau, 2009a). 
15 Note that risk premia reached historically low levels over the five years that preceded the 
financial crisis. 
  13explained by deviations from the efficient markets hypothesis (ECB, 2005). According to 
this hypothesis, market participants possess all available information and evaluate it 
rationally, distinguishing between temporary shocks and events with a long-lasting 
impact. Consequently, banks will have counter-cyclical behaviour and can appreciate the 
true state of the economy and reduce (increase) their loans by increasing (decreasing) 
loans interest rate when the economic cycle is reaching its maximum (minimum) point. 
In reality though, markets may function in a less than efficient manner. Inefficient 
functioning of the markets can be explained by several hypotheses (Beattie et al., 1995), 
the most important of which are the following: 
•  Asymmetric information hypothesis: This hypothesis
16 rests on the fact that 
borrowers have more knowledge than lenders about a project. This fact, combined 
with the adverse selection hypothesis (i.e. the lender is unable to verify one or more 
of the project’s key characteristics), affects banks’ behaviour: banks are willing to 
grant more loans in the upward phase of the cycle and reluctant in the downward 
phase (thereby significantly reducing the level of competition). The asymmetric 
information hypothesis is also directly related to provisioning practices, since 
increasing provisions lowers banks’ profitability and possibly their dividends, 
transmitting  negative messages (signalling) to the market about their financial 
condition
17. Even if dividends are not reduced, it is difficult for the management of a 
bank to make higher provisions than the rest of the industry, in view of the need to 
avoid giving a negative message about its loan portfolio quality. Consequently, banks 
will choose the level of provisions that minimizes negative effects (Rajan, 1994). 
•  Principal–agent hypothesis: There may be a conflict of interest between the principal 
and the agent, either due to their different risk profiles or due to the principals’ 
difficulty in verify that the agent has acted in his interest or has made an “adverse 
selection” (Eisenhardt, 1989). This assumption leads to procyclicality when: (a) 
agents, because of high incentives from the principal (i.e. high bonuses), take 
excessive risks, which can lead to systemic instability; and (b) borrowers 
                                                 
16 Asymmetric information is considered as the main cause of procyclicality (ECB, 2005). 
17 At the beginning of this crisis, some banks distributed high dividends, despite the bleak 
industry outlook (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - BCBS, 2009). 
  14underestimate tail risk, retaining in that way the possibility for excess profits, while 
lenders risk losing their capital (Landau, 2009). Problems arising from the principal-
agent hypothesis can only partially be addressed by loan commitments, and therefore 
borrowers usually pledge collateral
18. 
•  Free-riding hypothesis: A bank’s management may not consider the impact of their 
choices on the stability of the financial system, particularly in the upward phase of the 
cycle. 
•  Moral hazard hypothesis: A bank’s management is convinced that, in the event of 
significant financial problems, it can rely on state support. 
•  Disaster myopia hypothesis: the behaviour of a bank’s management (but also that of 
borrowers) is myopic (Guttentag and Herring, 1986), in the sense that only short-term 
risks are considered, assuming that they are able to cope with a significant recession, 
based on previous experience, while underestimating the likelihood of an extremely 
negative economic event. This happens because banks tend to "forget" problems in 
their loan portfolios as time passes since the last crisis, due to the gradual withdrawal 
of experienced personnel, the softening of bank lending standards and the decreased 
ability of stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, supervisors, etc.) to control the bank's 
management
19. 
•  Cognitive dissonance hypothesis: A bank’s management engages in justifying past 
choices, even if they have been proven wrong. Cognitive dissonance may arise from 
(voluntary or involuntary) misinterpretation, oversight or rejection of available 
information in order to justify past choices. 
•  Herding behaviour hypothesis: A bank’s management and large institutional investors 
tend to follow their competitors, adding thereby to market volatility, in order: 
-  firstly, not to jeopardize their position if they follow wrong personal choices 
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990 and Rajan, 1994); 
                                                 
18 See Section 6.2.2 for possible consequences concerning irrational use of collateral. 
19 See also the institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and Udell, 2002). The authors use a 
sample of U.S. banks from the period 1980-2000 (including almost two economic cycles) and 
find evidence in favour of this hypothesis. Note that this hypothesis is linked to changes in bank 
financing during the credit cycle and not the business cycle. 
  15-  secondly, to look forward to government support in case of a severe crisis (Borio 
et al., 2001); 
-  thirdly, to take advantage of the situation, since it is common for executive 
remuneration schemes at banks to depend on the overall performance of the 
industry (Borio et al., 2001); 
-  fourth, to minimize the impact of adverse news spread from other (competing) 
banks on their cost of borrowing (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008). 
Herding behaviour, which is the outcome of information and technology 
uniformity, can cause sudden changes in market liquidity. These changes are believed to 
have contributed to sharp price fluctuations
20 in some cases (e.g. the Black Monday 
incident in the New York Stock Exchange in October 1987, the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso in December 1994 and the currency crisis of Southeast Asia in October 
1997 and Russia in August 1998) (Athanasoglou, 2004). 
On this basis, it can be concluded that the main sources of procyclicality can be 
attributed to market imperfections
21. 
 
6.2 Factors affecting procyclicality 
Procyclicality is affected by the following factors: First, those related to economic 
policy and banking supervision, second, those related to banking system’s regulations and 
practices and third, some other factors. 
 
                                                 
20 The effect of herd behaviour on market liquidity and hence on market volatility has been 
highlighted by Rajan (2005) and Hardouvelis (2010). 
21 The Financial Stability Board (FSB, former Financial Stability Forum, 2009a), refers, inter alia, 
to the restrictions imposed by risk assessment methods and assumptions on which these estimates 
are based, which strengthen the banking sector’s procyclicality. The significant under- or over-
estimation of risk, depending on the current phase of the economic cycle, is the reason for large 
changes in prices of financial assets and is the outcome of market imperfections, as noted above, 
but is also associated with the fact that it seems to be more difficult to measure the time 
dimension of risk, than to estimate risk correlations within the financial system (Borio and Zhu, 
2008). 
  166.2.1 Economic policy and banking supervision 
•  Fiscal policy. Fiscal policy must be countercyclical, in order to act as an economy 
stabilizer for the economy. Especially during recessions, fiscal policy (either by 
lowering taxes or by increasing government spending
22) can increase aggregate 
demand
23 and give the necessary impetus to growth
24. However, fiscal policy can 
cause the opposite effect, i.e. turn from being countercyclical to procyclical if public 
finances are not managed in prudently
25. Indeed, it has been found that, while fiscal 
policy is countercyclical and is not affected by economic cycles in developed 
countries, it is procyclical in emerging countries
26. In a crisis, the latter but also the 
former are likely to face higher costs or even major problems in financing their public 
sector, forcing their banks to raise lending interest rates and / or reduce loan supply, 
adding to procyclicality. 
•  Monetary policy. Monetary policy can contribute significantly to strengthening or 
mitigating procyclicality
27 (ECB, 2009c), through the following channels:  
First, the interest rate channel through which loan demand is affected. 
Second, the credit channel, which can be further broken down into: 
-  the bank lending channel (also referred to as the narrow credit channel), through 
which the cost of funding and the banks’ capital base are affected (see ECB, 
                                                 
22  There is a debate as to whether fiscal policy is more efficient by reducing taxes or by 
increasing expenditure (Mankiw, 2010). 
23 There is evidence that fiscal policy in OECD countries can be more effective in increasing 
aggregate demand during recession with limited access to bank financing and less effective 
during expansion (Tagkalakis, 2008). Fiscal policy (especially tax cuts and increases in non-wage 
government spending) - except for an increase in aggregate demand - tends to increase consumer 
and business confidence (Konstantinou and Tagkalakis, 2010). 
24 An increase in public spending, even during recession, may have a negative effect, since 
taxpayers will be expecting an increase in taxes, which will lead to an increase in savings rate 
(see Gordon and Leaper, 2005). 
25 In the period 2001-2009 was procyclical as the budget deficit persistently exceeded 3%, while 
no systematic effort was made to reduce the debt ratio to GDP (Provopoulos, 2010). Moreover, an 
"unsustainable" level of debt is expected to render an expansive (i.e. countercyclical) fiscal policy 
in times of crisis harmful for growth (IMF, 2009c). 
26 See Cuarda et al. (2009) for a review of the relevant literature. 
27 Since this can affect both banks’ ability and willingness to lend and the level of lending interest 
rates (ECB, 2009c). 
  172009c and Cappiello et al., 2010). Τhis channel also includes the bank capital 
channel
28; and  
-  the balance sheet channel (also called broad credit channel
29), through which 
potential borrowers’ property and collateral value is affected. 
Third, the risk taking channel
30. This transmission channel can be defined as the 
impact of changes in policy interest rates on risk perceptions or risk tolerance and 
operates through three channels: a) the effect of interest rates on cash flows, revenues 
and asset values of enterprises and households, b) the relationship between market 
interest rates and target rates of return
31, and c) the strategy concerning monetary 
policy communication functions and the reaction function of the Central Bank (Borio 
and Zhu, 2008). Several studies (Altunbas et al., 2010, Adrian and Shin, 2009 and 
ECB, 2009a) show that setting short-term rates at low levels over the past decade 
contributed to the increase in the level of risk in the banking industry, providing 
evidence of this mechanism. Furthermore, it has been shown that the level of short-
term interest rates reduces the incentive for screening potential borrowers (Dell’ 
Arricia and Marquez, 2006). However, no matter how important the risk taking 
channel is, it is extremely difficult to use the same tool (i.e. interest rates) as a means 
of achieving both price and financial stability at the same time (Barrell et al., 2010 
and Goodhart and Persaud, 2008). 
•  Banking supervision. Some studies have also examined the effect of supervision 
stringency on bank lending standards. Specifically, Krainer and Lopez (2009) have 
                                                 
28 A change in the interest rate causes a change in the value of financial assets, resulting in gains 
or losses on banks’ trading books. This affects banks’ capital adequacy and therefore their ability 
to lend (see ECB, 2009c, Sections 3 and 8.2 and Borio and Zhu, 2008 for references to studies 
that find evidence of this mechanism). 
29 A decrease in interest rates tends to increase the value of assets used as collateral by enterprises 
and households to obtain a loan, thereby reducing borrowing costs and offering the possibility of 
borrowing a larger amount. The opposite happens in the case of an increase in interest rates. See 
also Section 3 as well as ECB (2009c) for references to studies that find evidence of the balance 
sheet channel. 
30 This channel has been proposed by Borio and Zhu (2008), who argue that the importance of 
this mechanism has increased during the recent years due to changes in the financial system, its 
supervision, and the increasing role of market and funding liquidity. 
31 This relationship applies particularly for investment products with a guaranteed minimum 
return, e.g. bankassurance products.
 
  18found an inverse relationship between the economic cycle and supervision stringency 
in the USA for the period 1987-2004, which limited loan supply in the period 1989-
1992 (Peek and Rosengen, 1997). However, Berger et al. (2000) found that this factor 
caused only a minor tightening of bank credit standards in that country for the period 
1986-1994. Therefore, a very strict banking supervision
32 during recession may 
restrict bank loan supply, exacerbating procyclicality (Borio et al., 2001). 
6.2.2 Banking system’s regulations and practices 
Factors related to the banks’ regulatory framework (Basel II framework and 
accounting rules) and practices (borrowers’ collateral, leverage and liquidity 
management) are the following: 
•  Basel II prudential regulations
33. 
•  The application of accounting rules. This concerns mainly the fair value method, 
based on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the accounting 
treatment of realized and expected losses in the loan portfolio
34. 
•  Collateral. Procyclicality is strengthened by the change in collateral required during 
different phases of the economic cycle. Changes in collateral required have to do 
with: 
First, the amount of collateral required: This factor can influence lending, since the 
collateral required may be so high, that a potential borrower may be unable or 
unwilling to pledge it. 
Second, collateral valuation: Collateral valuation carried out by banks can be either at 
current market prices or (more conservative) at values which reflect fundamentals, 
thereby affecting the amount of borrowing, if this is directly related to collateral 
valuation.
Third, the loan to value ratio (LTV): It has been shown that the LTV ratio in some 
cases (for example in Japan and Great Britain in the decade of 1980) varies during the 
                                                 
32 A stricter supervision does not necessarily lead to a more stable financial system (Barth et al., 
2004). 
33 See Section 7 for a more detailed presentation. 
34 See Section 8 for a more detailed presentation. 
  19different phases of the economic cycle (Borio et al., 2001). More generally, collateral 
valuation carried out at market prices and a LTV ratio exceeding 100% can lead to 
increased procyclicality, especially in the case of a price decline in existing collateral 
and the requirement for an immediate pledge of additional collateral
35 (Financial 
Stability Forum - FSF, 2009). 
•  Leverage. During the period 2003-2007, the leverage of European banks rose, unlike 
that of U.S. banks. In fact, though, the leverage of U.S. banks was higher than shown 
in financial statements, due to structured products and off-balance sheet items. 
Maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities was significant, as banks financed 
long-term investments with short-term borrowing from the markets. After the 
outbreak of the crisis, a deleveraging process began, causing significant losses to 
banks. Six (6) market practices have been identified, which have contributed to an 
increase in  procyclicality of leverage in the financial system
36: 
-  The use of the mark-to-market
37 valuation method in order to estimate the value 
of financial products, especially in illiquid markets. 
-  The use of the Value at Risk
38 (VaR) and other market-sensitive methods, 
without taking into account the “through the cycle” volatility. According to the 
results produced by these methods, adjustments are made to banks’ trading and 
banking books. 
-  The use of triggers in OTC derivative contracts usually activated during periods 
of stress, according to which the provision of higher margin or other form of 
collateral is required. 
                                                 
35 Loss given default tends to increase in loans secured by assets that are procyclical (Borio et al., 
2001). 
36 See Joint FSF – CGFS (Committee on the Global Financial System) working group, 2009. 
37 It has been shown that leverage in conjunction with mark-to-market valuation is highly 
procyclical. U.S. banks tend to increase their leverage and their investments in risky assets in the 
upturns and reduce them in recession (Berger et al., 2008 for commercial banks and Adrian and 
Shin, 2008 for investment banks). 
38 See also Section 6.2.3. 
  20-  Margin requirements on derivatives
39. 
-  The recognition of unrealized profits on structured products, in spite of the 
associated risks still retained in the portfolio, and 
-  The use of alternative accounting methods to hedge accounting. 
•  Market liquidity and funding liquidity. Regarding the latter, banks need to refinance 
their liabilities, the maturity of which is less than that of their assets. Therefore, banks 
need to have access to money and capital markets, especially when the ratio of loans 
to deposits is higher than one. Consequently, market liquidity (i.e. the ease with 
which a bank carries out transactions in it) is essential for the functioning of banks
40. 
However, market liquidity (Jones, 2002) and funding liquidity are procyclical. This 
procyclicality is further reinforced by the fact that market liquidity risk, funding 
liquidity risk and credit risk are interrelated
41 (Andritzky et al., 2009). This became 
obvious during the last crisis: some banks were faced with substantial losses, which 
affected their capital base, and led to a loss of trust among the members of the 
financial system. International money and capital markets were transformed in very 
short time (especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers) from liquid to illiquid, 
and the interbank market came to a halt. Forced sales of financial assets at extremely 
low prices by banks trying to acquire the necessary liquidity exacerbated the problem. 
The situation prompted central banks worldwide to intervene, to meet liquidity needs. 
 
                                                 
39 For example, IMF (2007) observed increased margins in most countries in the summer of 2007. 
Changes in margins reinforce procyclicality, particularly in combination with the creation of a 
self-reinforcing cycle of liquidity constraints and rising losses on existing positions 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008). However, it is argued that the margin can also be counter-
cyclical, when expressed as a percentage of the instrument’s nominal value and not at its current 
market value (see Hardouvelis, 2010). 
40 However, increased market liquidity can lead banks to take up more risks, based on the 
assumption that it will be easier to liquidate risky assets in a potential crisis (Wagner, 2004). 
41 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) examine the combination of market liquidity risk and 
investors’ funding liquidity risk and argue that, during periods of increased market volatility, 
margins on naked positions also increase, reducing market liquidity and investors’ funding 
liquidity, leading to their mutual reduction. 
  216.2.3 Other factors 
The factors listed below refer to financial sector practices that tend to enhance the 
banking industry’s procyclicality. 
•  Credit rating agencies assessments. Usually, credit rating agencies aim to rate 
borrowers “through-the-cycle”. This means that credit rating agencies will take into 
consideration the downside scenario when assessing the probability of default. 
However, this does not imply that ratings by these agencies are acyclical: If the 
recession is worse than expected, there will inevitably be more downgrades. This 
partly explains the fact that both during the current crisis and in previous ones (such 
as the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the Asian crisis in the period 1997-1999), these 
agencies proceeded to relatively more downgrades, thereby enhancing procyclicality
42 
(Borio et al., 2001). By contrast, during the upward phase of the cycle, reports with 
improved ratings increase asymmetrically. Moreover, these agencies tend to revise 
their assessments by more than one notch when there are significant changes in the 
rated companies’ financial position, and these assessments are significantly 
influenced by the economic cycle (Amato and Furfine, 2003). 
•  The use of automated risk management systems and in particular VaR
43 (Value at 
Risk). The use of automated risk management systems can decrease (increase) 
investors’ risk aversion in periods of high (low) volatility since, VaR (or alternatively 
a portfolio’s potential loss) is typically calculated using recent data and current asset 
prices. Note that the calculation of VaR estimates is based on estimations about 
correlations between certain variables. However, it has been observed that correlation 
coefficients tend to increase in times of crisis or recession, meaning that the benefits 
of diversification tend to disappear when they are most needed (Longin and Solnik, 
                                                 
42 However, it is argued that credit rating agencies’ assessments are less procyclical than 
provisions carried out by banks (Borio et al., 2001), since the former assess the probability of a 
firm’s default over a longer time horizon (Borio and Zhu, 2008). Moreover, it is difficult for 
credit rating agencies to forecast a major crisis, so they are sometimes forced by the market to 
proceed to downgrades (Haldane et al., 2001). 
43 VaR is a portfolio’s maximum daily loss for a specified time and with a specified confidence 
interval. For example, if a portfolio’s one day VaR is 50 basis points with a confidence interval of 
99%, then it is expected that this portfolio will on average exhibit losses of over 50 basis points in 
one out of a hundred days. 
  222001). Consequently, banks should calculate the conditional VaR (CoVaR), that is the 
VaR of the financial system, conditional on a number of institutions being in distress 
(Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008). 
Moreover, market volatility (and by extension procyclicality) is influenced by the fact 
that financial firms tend to use similar risk management systems, leading to 
uniformity in their investment choices and their reactions to changes in fundamentals, 
which partly explains banks’ herding behaviour (Hardouvelis, 2010). 
•  Executive remuneration schemes in the financial sector. Remuneration schemes are 
based on the growth rates of revenues and profits, but the underlying risk tends not to 
be considered. There are indications that the U.S. wage structure and the amount of 
bonuses (mainly stock options) distributed to banks’ executives induces risk-taking 
(Chen et al., 2006). This phenomenon became pronounced after deregulation in the 
U.S. banking industry and the efforts of banks to gain market share (Davis and Zhu, 
2004).  The unsatisfactory functioning of corporate governance (as shareholders 
demanded increasing returns at a time when the market returns were low) was also a 
factor. 
 
6.3 Factors mitigating procyclicality 
It has been argued that market imperfections could also lead to the mitigation of 
banking sector’s procyclicality. Specifically, Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) conclude 
that banks in OECD countries during the 1990s exhibit a positive correlation between 
profitability and their provisions, reflecting countercyclical behaviour. This positive 
correlation is called the income smoothing hypothesis and can be explained by the fact 
that a bank’s management may wish to avoid major changes in profitability levels and, 
therefore, will choose to increase provisions in times of higher profitability, so that their 
net income does not vary significantly from year to year. Note, however, that increased 
profitability will not necessarily lead to increased provisions. The sum of provisions is 
influenced, among others, by the following two hypotheses: 
  23•  Capital management hypothesis: Banks with low capital adequacy ratio make higher 
provisions in order to improve this ratio, and 
•  Tax shield hypothesis: The tax deductibility of provisions from taxable income may 
be an incentive for banks to increase them.  
 
7. Basel ΙΙ and procyclicality 
This section deals with the question of whether Basel II amplifies banking system’s 
procyclicality. In order to answer this question, one needs to examine: 
•  Whether Basel II causes procyclicality of regulatory capital, through its Pillar I capital 
requirements. 
•  Whether Pillar II may further amplify procyclicality. 
•  Whether the credit standards of individual banks and the banking industry as a whole 
are altered by the Basel II framework to such an extent that they can cause 
fluctuations to the overall economic activity. 
 
7.1 Contribution of Basel II to procyclicality 
The Basel II framework has received significant criticism as regards its contribution 
to strengthening procyclicality (Report de Larosière, 2009). This criticism relates to the 
volatility of capital requirements and the relationship between capital buffers, provisions 
and equity and the business cycle. 
The volatility of capital requirements depends on the approach according to which 
these are gauged. More precisely, when capital requirements are gauged using the 
standardized approach, asset weights are determined by the credit ratings of companies 
financed and are therefore as procyclical as the ratings from the credit rating agencies
44. 
                                                 
44 There are three alternative approaches of varying degree of sophistication under Basel II for 
computing capital requirements: the standardized approach, the foundation internal ratings-based 
(IRB) approach and the advanced IRB approach. The standardized approach uses ratings from 
credit rating agencies in order to assess the credit risk of the financed companies. Basel II sets a 
weighting of 75% for loans to companies with an annual turnover of up to 2.5 million euros, and 
a weighting equal to that of the government’s rating with a minimum of 100%, for loans to 
  24The calculation of capital requirements for credit risk under the IRB approaches is based 
on six parameters, of which the following three are affected by the economic cycle (ECB, 
2005): 
•  Probability of default
45 (PD). 
•  Loss given default
46 (LGD). The LGD tends to rise during downturns, amplified by 
the fact that recovery rates for defaulted loans are lower during recession than during 
expansion. Note that during recessions, the value of collateral, which is used to 
reduce the actual loss for a bank, tends to decrease. 
•  Exposure at default. This is higher during recessions, as customers tend to make full 
use of their credit lines (Jimenez et al., 2007). 
The volatility of capital requirements due to Basel II (and the consequent 
exacerbation of procyclicality) has been confirmed empirically. More precisely, a study 
by Kashyap and Stein (2004) shows that according to Standard and Poor's model, the 
capital charge
47 is estimated at 30-45%, while according to the KMV model capital 
charge is estimated at 70-90% , keeping LGD constant. However, the latter tends to rise 
during recession, therefore capital charge is underestimated. The authors also estimated 
that any capital buffers created during expansion will not be sufficient to deal with 
procyclicality in a major recession. Therefore, Basel II enhances the banking sector’s 
procyclicality, since it relates the capital requirements for a loan to its PD. 
Studies by Erwin and Wide (2001), Segoviano and Lowe (2002), Peura and 
Jokivuolle (2004), Gordy and Howells (2006) and Repullo and Suarez (2008) reach a 
similar conclusion, although their estimates about the impact of Basel II on regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                   
companies with an annual turnover of over 2.5 million euros. According to the foundation IRB 
approach, each bank estimates probability of default and exposure at default, while loss given 
default is estimated by the supervising authority. Under the advanced IRB approach, the bank 
also estimates loss given default. 
45 PD’s cyclical pattern has been confirmed empirically (Altman, 2004, Fama, 1986 and Barnhill 
and Maxwell, 2002), although it is unclear whether it affects high-or-low-rated firms. 
46 LGD is related both to the state of the economy (Altman et al., 2002 and Acharaya et al., 2004) 
and PD (see Allen and Saunders, 2004 and the cited bibliography). 
47 Additional capital for banks in Europe and the U.S. needed in order to maintain minimum 
capital adequacy in the period 1998-2002, if Basel II had already been implemented. The amount 
of this additional capital emerges from models used by the credit ratings agencies Standard and 
Poor's and KMV. 
  25capital vary considerably, probably due to different samples of banks and methodologies 
used. The latter concluded that Basel II is more procyclical than Basel I, although the 
former leads to a strengthened banking system. As mentioned in Section 3, capital 
adequacy rules tend to restrict loan supply (see also relevant literature in Borio and Zhu, 
2008). 
The relationship between capital buffers and the economic cycle has also been 
examined in the literature. Jokipii and Milne (2008) argue that there is a negative 
relationship between European banks' capital buffers and GDP over the economic cycle
48 
(1997-2004), which is thought to amplify the procyclicality caused by Basel II. Likewise, 
Heid (2007), using a large sample of banks in OECD countries for the year 2004, 
establishes that Basel II strengthens banking sector’s procyclicality - especially in those 
countries where companies rely on bank financing - even if banks retain considerable 
capital buffers.
The relationship between provisions and equity and the economic cycle has been 
examined by a series of studies, which usually lead to the conclusion that there is a 
negative relationship between provisions and GDP, which implies procyclicality (Bikker 
and Metzemakers, 2005, Borio et al., 2001, Laeven and Majnoni, 2003 and Craig et al., 
2006). This problem is mitigated by the fact that banks tend to make more provisions 
when their profits grow
49 (this behaviour can be attributed to the income smoothing 
hypothesis). However, there is significant variation in provisions policies among banks of 
various countries (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). 
Apart from Basel’s II contribution to amplifying procyclicality, the framework has 
also been criticized in other areas. Persaud (2008a) argues that Basel II cannot protect 
against a crisis, as capital requirements’ calculations are based on market prices, and 
therefore regulatory capital inevitably follows the pattern of the cycle. In the upward 
phase of the cycle, banks seem to face low risks, while during recessions they appear to 
face high risks. Furthermore, Persaud (2008a) argues that Pillar III will act as a means of 
pressure for banks with high capital adequacy ratios in the upward phase of the cycle, 
                                                 
48 See Ayuso et al. (2002) and Stolz and Wedow (2005) for similar conclusions about Spanish and 
German banks, respectively. 
49 See Arpa et al., (2001) for similar conclusions about the Austrian banks. 
  26because shareholders will demand returns on capital equivalent to banks with lower 
capital, and therefore banks will rather be pushed to take on higher risks to achieve 
increased profitability, rather than to retain high capital adequacy ratios in order to 
address future downturns. 
The de Larosière report (2009) states that the recent crisis has revealed the tendency 
for Basel II to generate procyclical behaviour (although it is recognized that Basel II is 
improved compared to Basel I) and that a “fundamental review” is required, since a series 
of false assumptions were made such as: 
•  Market volatility was underestimated, mainly due to the use of recent data, which did 
not capture fat tail outcomes; 
•  The ability of banks to manage risks was overestimated; and 
•  The assumption that risks would be distributed through securitization, reducing 
thereby systemic risk, proved incorrect on a global basis. 
 
7.2 Arguments in favour of the counter-cyclical behaviour of Basel II  
It is argued that the proper implementation of the framework’s recommendations 
and guidelines does not necessarily lead to an exacerbation of the banking industry’s 
inherent procyclicality. To understand the debate, it is useful to recognize that Basel II 
can lead to an amplification of procyclicality when at least three causal links are present 
(Saurina, 2008): 
•  Capital requirements have to increase (decrease) in the downward (upward) phase of 
the cycle. However, Basel II contains the following mechanisms designed to dampen 
this problem: 
First, it is recommended that banks use a time horizon of at least one business cycle
50 
in order to estimate the PD and LGD
51 ("ideally cover at least one business cycle"), 
although banks are required to use only one year data. If banks follow this 
recommendation, the relative change in capital requirements between the peak and 
                                                 
50 Catarieneu-Rabell et al. (2005) point out that such a policy may limit Basel’s II procyclicality. 
51 Basel II requires the use of downturn LGD estimates at any time in the business cycle. 
  27the lowest point of the cycle is reduced to almost 1 / 5 compared to the use of one 
year data. 
Second, stress tests are proposed. The proper application of stress tests can offset 
Basel II’s procyclicality (Taylor and Goodhart, 2004). 
•  Banks’ capital adequacy - as set by Basel II (Pillar I) – has to be close to its 
minimum. In practice, however, banks hold capital significantly higher than set by 
capital requirements
52. Moreover, because Pillar III requires improved transparency, 
it may be difficult for a bank to retain its capital adequacy levels near the minimum 
throughout the entire business cycle and not to provoke a reaction from stakeholders. 
The importance of capital buffers in mitigating significantly Basel II’s procyclicality 
has been confirmed empirically (Peura and Jokivuolle, 2004, and Heid, 2007). 
•  Loan demand and supply may not depend directly on bank’s capital buffers. 
Zhu (2008) argues that studies which have concluded that procyclicality may be 
exacerbated by Basel II
53 should be examined with caution, because they: a) consider a 
passive and not an active portfolio strategy; b) consider only regulatory capital, although 
it is known that banks maintain higher total capital (part of which are capital buffers); and 
c) do not address the dynamic evolution of regulatory capital in the course of the 
economic cycle. The author notes that during recession, Basel II’s increased volatility in 
regulatory capital requirements compared to Basel I, does not necessarily lead to a 
reduction in loan supply (i.e. there is not necessarily a procyclicality issue), since banks 
chose their lending portfolio before the crisis not according to minimum capital 
requirements. Furthermore, capital adequacy rules enhance the stability of individual 
banks and the financial system. 
                                                 
52 According to Jokipii and Milne (2008), the EU-25 banks' capital buffer amount on average to 
3.77% (i.e. 3.77% higher than 8% defined as the minimum capital adequacy ratio). It is assumed 
that the size of the capital buffer is determined by factors such as the risks undertaken, the 
requirements of credit rating agencies, the imposition of fines for violation of capital adequacy 
rules, the need to borrow from the markets with a relatively low rate (Jokipii and Milne, 2008) 
and in order to prevent a dividend reduction in case of a profitability shortfall (Saurina, 2008). 
53 The number of empirical studies which have concluded that Basel II does not amplify 
procyclicality substantially is limited. Zakrajsek et al. (2001) find no significant amplification in 
regulatory capital procyclicality, while Ayuso et al. (2002) and Stolz and Wedow (2005) argue 
that it is not clear whether Basel II amplifies procyclicality. It is however expected that increased 
volatility in regulatory capital may also influence economic capital (Taylor and Goodhart, 2004) 
  28In the theoretical literature it has been shown that the implementation of Basel II 
shall lead to a mitigation of procyclicality, because banks are expected to alter their loan 
portfolio according to the state of the economy (see ECB, 2009b and the literature cited 
there). This is explained by the fact that during recession, capital requirements for loans 
to firms with high credit ratings are expected to increase more than for loans to firms with 
low credit ratings
54. Consequently, banks will reduce lending to creditworthy firms and 
increase lending to firms with lower credit ratings. 
However, in reality, it is unclear whether bank access would be curtailed to firms 
with high credit ratings during recession. More specifically, it has been found that U.S. 
banks have increased interest rate margins on high-risk (low rated) firms more than the 
medium or low risk firms during the 2001 recession (Basset and Zakrajsek, 2003). 
Besides, there is a negative correlation between interest rates charged on loans to firms 
and their credit ratings (Bernanke, 2009). Therefore, firms with high credit ratings are not 
expected to face difficulties in their bank financing. 
Basel II’s procyclicality may also be attenuated by the counter-cyclical behaviour 
of capital requirements for operational risk: According to the Basic Indicator Approach 
and the Standardised Approach, capital requirements for operational risk are calculated as 
a percentage of total revenues. However, during recession, total revenues tend to decrease 
(mainly due to the decline in revenues from financial activities), and therefore capital 
requirements for operational risk will also decline (Allen and Saunders, 2004). 
Finally, a study of the ECB (in cooperation with the Banking Supervision 
Committee (BSC) and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors
55 (CEBS)) 
concluded that Basel’s II procyclicality was rather limited (ECB, 2009b). 
 
                                                 
54 See Kashyap and Stein (2004). This result is explained by the fact that the room for a further 
deterioration in the credit rating of firms with already low credit ratings is limited (since these 
firms will face bankruptcy), while higher rated firms have more room for their ratings to 
deteriorate. 
55 This committee is now called “European Banking Authority”. 
  297.3 Conclusions on the procyclical behaviour of Basel II 
From the analysis in this chapter, we can conclude that Basel II seems to increase 
the volatility of capital requirements over the business cycle. Because capital plays a 
fundamental role in loan supply, we can conclude that the banking system’s 
procyclicality tends to be amplified by Basel II. The magnitude and scale of this 
amplification depends on a number of factors such as: the size of capital buffers
56, the 
approach adopted for computing capital requirements, the banks’ portfolio composition 
during the business cycle and the appropriate use of the time horizon for the estimation of 
PD and LGD. 
However, it should be recognized, that Basel II’s risk sensitivity in the calculation 
of capital requirements is in the right direction and leads to a more stable financial 
system. Indeed, Basel II is considered as an important factor that led banks to improve 
their practices for monitoring and managing risks (Borio and Zhu, 2008). Moreover, 
Basel II has not been fully implemented, since it came into force on January 1
st, 2008 in 
the European Union, while it had not been yet applied in the U.S. For this reason, BCBS 
(2009) notes that it is premature to determine whether Basel II is more cyclical than 
expected. 
In any case, it is estimated that an optimal system of capital requirements that can 
offset procyclicality, should be able to track the economic cycle, i.e. capital requirements 
should be relatively higher in the upward phase and lower in the downward phase. 
 
8. Accounting standards and procyclicality 
In order to determine the role of accounting standards (especially of fair-value 
accounting) in amplifying procyclicality, it should be examined whether they increase the 
volatility of banks’ earnings and capital and whether this volatility affects bank credit 
standards. Moreover, current accounting standards should be compared with alternative 
accounting methods. 
                                                 
56 Basel II’s procyclical behaviour affects mainly banks with marginal capital adequacy and 
liquidity, while banks with capital levels significantly higher than the minimum will only be 
affected during a major crisis (ECB, 2009b). 
  308.1 Potential drawbacks of current accounting standards 
The main potential drawbacks of current accounting standards as regards 
procyclicality refer to: first, the increased volatility caused to banks’ financial statements, 
second, the rules concerning the incurred and expected losses in loan portfolios and, 
third, the impact of accounting standards on banks’ lending standards. 
As far as the increased volatility in the banks’ financial statements is concerned, 
there are indications that the use of fair value accounting by large European banks would 
increase volatility following shocks to interest rates, share prices and property prices 
(Enria et al., 2004). It is possible, however, that this increased volatility does not reflect a 
change in fundamentals, but may rather be the outcome of market imperfections (Borio 
and Tsatsaronis, 2006), random effects and / or speculation (Platin et al., 2008 Vinals, 
2008). This problem is exacerbated in markets with limited liquidity and trading activity, 
due to the interaction of these factors, affecting both the speed and extent of changes in 
leverage and asset prices
57 and thereby increasing systemic risk (Shin, 2006). Therefore, 
banks with a short-term investment horizon may choose to act according to their 
expectations about short-term price movements, thereby amplifying the current trend in 
prices
58. In this way, the fair value method leads to an endogenous volatility of prices 
(Platin et al., 2008a, 2008b), and makes procyclicality endogenous. Moreover, the 
volatility caused by this method may increase because of estimation errors, inherent 
volatility and the use of the mixed attributes model (i.e. the application of fair-value 
accounting to some instruments and amortized cost accounting to others) when preparing 
financial statements
59, reducing the netting effect (Barth, 2004). 
                                                 
57  It is argued, that fair value accounting can significantly impair market liquidity, thereby 
affecting prices of financial assets, banks’ capital adequacy and, ultimately, their solvency 
(Persaud, 2008b).  In markets with limited liquidity, prices of financial assets are largely 
determined by the buyer’s liquidity (Allen and Carletti, 2008). 
58 The amplification of the current trend in asset prices is examined by Boyer (2007). He refers to 
the existence of an accounting accelerator, which adds on the financial accelerator and 
strengthens the existing volatility. The accounting accelerator exists because fair value accounting 
mixes information on an asset’s cash flows and the market’s risk appetite and consequently asset 
valuation. 
59 For example, interest rate derivatives (used to hedge interest rate risk) appear in financial 
statements using the fair value method, while at the same time the loan portfolio (where the 
interest rate risk is present) is (usually) calculated on the basis of the historical cost method. 
  31The use of fair value accounting is not limited to the banks’ trading portfolio, but 
can also be applied to the loan portfolio. Therefore, changes in interest rates can lead to 
significant changes in the value of the loan portfolio
60, although the bank's intention may 
be to hold these loans to maturity (Tumpel-Gugerell, 2010 and Enria et al., 2004). 
Because of this, mark-to-market rules may be ideal for investment banks and trading 
activities, but are not appropriate for the business model of commercial banks, since the 
latter are induced to operate with a short-term perspective
61 (de Larosière report, 2009) 
Regarding the accounting standards for incurred and expected losses in the loan 
portfolio, it is argued that these exacerbate procyclicality because incurred losses do not 
relate to expected losses, i.e. provisions for future losses are not allowed
62 (Saurina, 2008 
and Tumpel-Gugerell, 2010). During recessions, non-performing loans tend to rise and 
banks exhibit losses that reduce their capital and their ability to lend. These problems are 
exacerbated during periods of sharp declines in liquidity. 
Finally, regarding the impact of accounting standards on credit standards, the latter 
are expected to be directly affected by a change in both the regulatory and economic 
capital of banks (see Section 3 and Enria et al., 2004) and indirectly by an increase in the 




8.2 Advantages of current accounting standards 
The main advantages of current accounting standards have to do with the increased 
transparency of the banks’ financial statements, which can enhance market discipline and 
                                                 
60 This is the case when the bank has chosen the fair value method rather than historical cost 
accounting for its loan portfolio. 
61 Platin et al. (2008b) concluded that the mark-to-market method is preferable in the case of 
relatively short-term and junior assets that are traded in highly liquid markets, while historical 
cost accounting is preferable in the case of senior assets with the opposite characteristics (like the 
majority of a commercial bank’s assets).
62 Note that the expected loss is taken into account when calculating an asset’s net present value 
when fair value accounting is applied (via the discount rate), but credit risk is not separated from 
other risks (Enria et al., 2004). 
63  This increased volatility due to the application of the fair value method may be interpreted as 
an indication of increased risk, thus raising the cost of funding (Barth, 2004 and Platin et al., 
2008b). 
  32provide timely information to investors and stakeholders about potential financial 
problems (Vinals, 2008). Therefore, since banks’ financial statements were procyclical 
even before the application of fair value accounting, this method is an ideal choice for 
financial sector companies, although its disadvantages should be corrected
64 (Novoa et 
al., 2009). However, when financial statements are published, they are already outdated, 
since they quote market prices one or more months before. Therefore, the provision of 
timely information to investors is questionable. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that fair value accounting was neither liable for 
asset fire-sales nor did it add significantly to the severity of the last financial crisis (Laux 
and Leuz, 2009). 
Finally, despite the fact that the use of the alternative historical cost accounting in 
banks’ financial statements may be less volatile than fair value accounting, in the case of 
a financial asset’s price fall, the relevant loss has to be presented in the financial 
statements, and the result will be similar to that of the fair value method. 
 
9. Proposals to the banking sector’s procyclicality issue 
9.1 General characteristics of the proposals 
The preceding analysis has shown that Basel II and accounting standards, despite 
criticism about their role in exacerbating banking sector’s procyclicality, still constitute a 
notable set of rules for the operation of banks. For this reason, the proposals for 
mitigating banking sector’s procyclicality which are presented in this Section seek to 
address their weaknesses while maintaining their positive aspects.
Depending on the source of procyclicality they are designed to address, the 
proposals may be grouped into those related to: 
•  the Basel ΙΙ framework, 
•  accounting rules, 
                                                 
64 Note that if a bank’s credit rating deteriorates, the present value of its debt will decrease (since 
this is estimated using fair value accounting), thereby increasing its regulatory capital (Novoa et 
al., 2009 and IMF, 2008).
  33•  leverage and liquidity in the banking sector, and 
•  other proposals. 
 
9.2 Proposals concerning the Basel II framework 
Proposals to dampen procyclicality attributed to the Basel II framework can be 
divided into two categories: first, those concerning capital buffers
65 and capital 
requirements, and second, those related to other aspects, such as insurance for banks, 
bond issuance, etc. 
The first category can be further divided into: first, those relating to general rules 
for the banking industry (rules or system-wide variables); and, second, those relating to 
individual banks (discretion or bank-specific variables
66). 
There is an ongoing discussion in the literature about the positive and the negative 
aspects of rules and discretion. In the following text, we present the main proposals 
concerning rules and discretion. Some of these proposals were finally adopted by Basel 
III. 
 
9.2.1 Using rules to calculate capital requirements and capital buffers 
It is argued that capital buffers and capital requirements should be based on 
“built-in stabilizers” for the whole banking system. Built-in stabilizers limit the danger 
that, if a threat is identified, proper actions will be taken by supervisors, despite any 
reactions from the markets (Borio, 2009, IMF, 2009a, Caprio, 2010 and Caruana, 2010). 
As far as the calculation of capital requirements is concerned, the main proposals 
are the following:  
•  The change in minimum capital requirements according to the current phase of 
business cycle, using different confidence intervals for their calculation (Kashyap and 
Stein, 2004 and Repullo and Suarez, 2008). The relationship between capital 
                                                 
65 Capital buffers should be adequate in order for banks to remain solvent (i.e. above the 
minimum capital requirement) in a "feasibly severe downturn” (BCBS, 2009). 
66 See Caruana (2010). There are also proposals that combine rules and discretion (Repullo and 
Suarez, 2008). 
  34requirements for any loan and its probability of default may be reflected in a risk 
curve. In order to avoid the substantial increase in capital requirements in the 
downturns, Kashyap and Stein have proposed the use of different risk curves, 
depending on the phase of the cycle (e.g. a confidence interval of 99.9% in the 
upward phase and of 99% in the downward phase). This proposal can dampen the 
procyclicality without simultaneously compromising significantly the stability of the 
banking system. However, this proposal has the potential drawback of moral hazard 
on the part of supervisors. 
•  The smoothing of the minimum capital requirements, using either an autoregressive 
rule or a countercyclical indexing rule, which will adjust Basel II’s capital 
requirements using an adjustment factor which is larger than one in the upward phase 
of the cycle and less than one in the downward phase (Gordy and Howells, 2006). 
•  The change in minimum capital requirements, based on the average observed ratio of 
equity to total assets in a country
67 (or equivalently individual bank equity should be 
based on average equity of the whole banking sector) (Gersbach and Hahn, 2010).  
Note that capital requirements tend to reduce the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism through the banking system (see Bliss and Kaufman, 
2002). During recession, banks may not be able to make use of the central bank's liquidity 
(i.e. to grant loans), if they don’t have the required capital adequacy (because of the 
increased PD and LGD). In this case, there is a need for minimum capital requirements to 
be able to change, so as to increase bank lending. In essence, a framework with varying 
capital requirements depending on the current phase of the economic cycle is suggested. 
As far as the calculation of capital buffers is concerned, the following types of 
capital buffers have been proposed: 
•  The build-up of capital buffers in the upward phase of the cycle, which can then be 
used in the downward phase. This proposal had been supported by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009a), the de Larosière report (2009), the Warwick 
Commission (2009) and Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and was finally adopted by Basel 
                                                 
67 This proposal can be considered as a rule (depending on the banking sector’s structure) or 
discretion (according to each bank’s size). 
  35III. However, although this proposal is plausible, it should not be used in every 
country, since the relationship between GDP growth and the countercyclical capital 
buffer can be negative (Repullo and Saurina, 2011). In order to calculate banks’ 
capital buffers, the use of the following macroeconomic indicators has been proposed: 
-  The weighted average of banks’ assets rate of growth, where the weights are 
based on the inflation target, the average long-term growth rate of GDP and the 
ratio of total bank lending to GDP (Goodhart and Persaud, 2008). 
-  The deviation between the current and the long-term average growth rate of 
GDP (Repullo et al., 2009). 
•  The creation of a capital conservation range, i.e. a mandatory capital buffer above the 
regulatory minimum requirement, which can be used to absorb losses in a crisis. This 
range would be built up gradually and calculated as part of yearly net earnings, 
reducing the distributable profits
68 (BCBS, 2009). 
•  The increase in capital requirements for market risk in the trading portfolio, complex 
securitizations and resecuritisations, and the calculation of capital requirements based 
on VaR estimates for a period of twelve months, simulating significant financial 
stress (BCBS, 2009). It has also been proposed (see Section 6.2.3), that banks should 
calculate the conditional VaR (CoVaR) (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008). 
 
9.2.2 Using discretion to calculate capital buffers for every individual bank or country 
It is argued that capital buffers should be calculated separately for each bank 
(discretion), since: 
•  The impact of the business cycle on banks' financial statements is related to the 
quality of their assets (ECB, 2009b). Banks with assets of lower quality exhibit higher 
PD in the downturns, which, among other things, should be taken into account when 
calculating their capital buffers (Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2009). 
                                                 
68 Distributable profits include dividends, share repurchases, discretionary payments on Tier I 
capital instruments and bonuses to employees (non-distributed profits are included in Tier I 
capital). 
  36•  Many banks maintain significantly higher regulatory capital levels than those set out 
by Basel II (Gordy and Howells, 2006 and Jokipii and Milne, 2008). 
•  There is heterogeneity in the risk diversification of banks’ portfolios, when capital 
adequacy rules are altered, due to individual bank’s characteristics, banking sector 
characteristics and the macroeconomic conditions in each country (Delis et al., 2009). 
•  However, it is noted that discretion makes it difficult for the supervisory authorities to 
evaluate the size of the capital buffer and the banking sector’s procyclicality may not 
be significantly attenuated (ECB, 2009b). Therefore, it is suggested that individual 
countries can use discretion, to some extent, when defining the size of the capital 
buffer.  
Some of the proposals concerning each bank’s capital buffer calculation are the 
following: 
•  Each bank’s contribution to the overall systemic risk (Acharaya et al. 2009 and 
Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008). 
•  The bank’s credit growth and leverage ratio compared with industry average, and the 
maturity mismatch of assets and liabilities (Brunnermeier et al., 2009 and Persaud, 
2008b), and 
•  The use of the average (or alternatively through-the-cycle) and/or the highest average 
estimate for the bank’s PD
69, separately for each exposure class (BCBS, 2009, 
Caprio, 2010). 
A first step towards the use of discretion has already been taken, in the form of 
extra capital requirements for systemically important banks. However, we are sceptical 
about the wide use of discretion. Common monetary policy across European countries, as 
well as matters concerning the efficiency of the banking system and the ability to 
compare across banks may hampered by using different rules for each individual 
institution, or even country. 
 
                                                 
69 I.e., the use of a downturn PD. 
  379.2.3 Proposals unrelated to capital requirements and capital buffers 
Creating a safe banking system by setting high capital requirements may impose 
high costs on society and reduce the effectiveness of banking intermediation. For this 
reason, proposals have been developed that in normal periods will not impose 
“intolerably large” costs to banks: 
•  Private insurance for banks. It has been suggested that banks could buy private 
insurance
70. In the case that a bank’s capital adequacy ratio falls below a threshold, 
the bank receives an amount of money large enough to restore it (Gersbach, 2004, 
Kashyap et al., 2008 and Repullo and Suarez, 2008). This proposal, however, has two 
major drawbacks: First, it is extremely difficult to determine at what level of capital 
adequacy and to what extent this private insurance will be activated, while moral 
hazard will increase significantly (since banks will take up high risks more easily). 
Second, this suggestion may solve a bank’s capital adequacy problem, by transferring 
it to another part of the financial sector (insurance companies and pension funds), 
which may be more vulnerable to a crisis. 
•  Convertible bonds. The relevant proposals are: (a) the issuance of bonds that will be 
automatically converted into ordinary shares (reverse convertible debentures - RDCs), 
when the market’s assessment for a bank’s capital to assets ratio falls below a 
threshold (Flannery, 2005); and (b) the mandatory issuance of convertible bonds (at a 
predetermined price) by banks deemed too big to fail (Vermaelen and Wolf, 2009). 
The difference between this proposal and other similar proposals is that existing 
shareholders are given the opportunity to buy these shares, so as not to transfer wealth 
from current shareholders to bondholders, while the interest rate on these bonds 
would be lower than those of common bonds. 
•  Changes to the objectives of supervision. In recent years, securitization was at the 
centre of banks’ activity in order to manage risk. In this way, however, banks changed 
from organizations managing credit risk (in which banks are specialized) to 
organizations managing market risk and liquidity. A supervisory body that focuses on 
the ability of financial sector firms to manage the risks they have undertaken in 
                                                 
70 This insurance may be provided by insurance companies, mutual or pension funds. 
  38conjunction with the application of some methods to calculate counter-cyclical capital 
requirements, may lead to an more stable financial system overall, where the need for 
central bank intervention will be rarer (see Persaud, 2008b). 
 
9.3 Proposals concerning accounting rules 
In order to address procyclicality attributed to accounting rules, the following are 
proposed: 
•  The implementation of dynamic provisioning and through-the-cycle provisioning
71. 
Dynamic provisioning generates a fund in the upward phase of the cycle (Novoa et 
al., 2009), which covers the losses incurred in the downward phase of the cycle, 
without affecting net earnings
72. For maximum effectiveness, dynamic provisions 
should be tax deductible and presented in the financial statements (Andritzky et al., 
2009). Finally, dynamic provisioning should be used not only in the loan portfolio, 
but also in the trading portfolio (see Landau, 2009b and Section 9.4.2)
73, which, 
however, will inevitably compromise investors’ information about the company’s 
current financial situation (IMF, 2008). 
•  Replacement of IFRS 39 with IFRS 9 (IASB, 2010), so as to reduce complexity
74 
(Grant Thornton, 2009). The differences between IFRS 9 and IFRS 39 relate to: (a) 
                                                 
71 Through-the-cycle provisioning refers to provisions made based on the expected LGD of a loan 
throughout its duration. Dynamic (or statistical) provisioning is an extension of through-the-cycle 
provisioning and is calculated using time series on PDs (Novoa et al., 2009). Dynamic forecasts 
have been applied in Spain since 2000, Colombia since 2008 and experimentally in Peru recently. 
Their calculation is based on the weighted average of general and specific provisions. Note, that 
while dynamic provisioning have proved useful in the current crisis, they are not a panacea, since 
there is no guarantee that they will be sufficient in a major crisis, and since they cover only a 
bank’s loan portfolio and not its trading book (Saurina, 2009 and Brunnermeier et al., 2009). 
72 However, Pederzoli et al. (2010) argue that the use of estimates covering the entire business 
cycle by banks during recession may lead to higher levels of defaulted loans and lower 
profitability. 
73 This does not apply only to IFRS, but also to American Accounting Standards (US GAAP). 
Both address provisions in the same manner, but differ significantly in the way they are applied in 
various countries, which is due to tax and historical reasons, as well as the way supervision is 
exercised (FSF, 2009a).
74 The process to replace IFRS 39 with IFRS 9 has been completed by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The reduction in complexity results from the classification 
of financial assets either in amortized cost or in fair value depending on the bank's business model 
and each financial asset’s cash flow characteristics, if this has not been designated at fair value 
through profit or loss. The proposed date for full implementation of FRS 9 is January 1
st 2013. 
  39the application of fair value in financial statements, with an emphasis on the changes 
in the value of debt and the effect of these changes on net earnings; (b) the 
recognition of losses in the banking and the loan portfolio; and (c) hedge accounting. 
Regarding the recognition of losses in the portfolio, the IASB has proposed an 
alternative method to dynamic provisioning, namely the Expected Cash Flow Model. 
According to this method, provisions are formed on the basis of expected losses in the 
bank’s loan and banking portfolio and a real discount rate is estimated. The European 
Commission considered, however, that dynamic provisions generated by this method 
would not be sufficient, although this method’s contribution to dampening 
procyclicality has been recognized (Bank of Greece, 2010b). 
•  The use of transparent qualitative and quantitative notes supplementing the valuation 
of financial assets when using mark-to-model valuation, and taking into account the 
current phase of the economic cycle and the existence of outliers (IMF, 2008, 2009a, 
2009b). In particular, in the case of a financial crisis accompanied by market 
illiquidity, Allen and Carletti (2008) have proposed that fair value accounting should 
be supplemented by mark-to-model as well as historic cost valuations. 
•  The use of assessments made by specialized companies (IMF, 2008, 2009a, 2009b). 
•  The accounting treatment of financial assets depending on whether they are financed 
with short-or long-term capital (Persaud, 2008b). 
 
9.4   Proposals concerning leverage, market liquidity and funding liquidity 
Addressing procyclicality deriving from the combination of leverage and funding 
liquidity is difficult because of their interaction. Proposals to attenuate procyclicality 
from this source are presented below. 
The use of a maximum leverage ratio
75 for each bank has been proposed. The 
advantages of this ratio are the following: a) the riskiness of assets is not taken into 
                                                 
75 The leverage ratio is equal to the ratio of total assets (which include off-balance sheet assets) to 




  40account. Therefore, it is not affected by the pricing of risk over the economic cycle
76, b) 
banks’ capital structure is determined on the basis of specific cross-sectional 
determinants, which are similar to those of the non-financial business sector, except for 
banks with marginal capital adequacy ratios (Gropp and Heider, 2009), in conjunction 
with the fact that U.S. banks appear to actively manage their leverage ratio (Berger et al., 
2008); c) it is transparent (Blum, 2008) and d) it is related to the bank’s viability in 
extreme circumstances (Joint FSF-CGFS Working Group, 2009). 
The disadvantages of this ratio are that: a) it is rather restrictive, especially in the 
case of hedging positions; b) it may lead to increased risk being undertaken by banks (in 
order to increase efficiency); and c) it may lead to a deleveraging process in the downturn 
phase of the economic cycle (IMF, 2009b). 
Another proposal concerning leverage is to increase the margin requirements on 
OTC derivatives, along with the imposition of minimum haircuts for securities financing 
transactions (Joint FSF-CGFS Working Group, 2009). 
The proposals concerning liquidity are the following (Joint FSF-CGFS Working 
Group, 2009): 
•  The promotion of through-the-cycle measures of market risk. Moreover, valuation 
reserves could be held in the case of weak data or modeling supporting the valuation. 
•  The imposition of stress tests for new risks or new financial products. 
•  The restricted use of contractual trigger (i.e. provisions in a contract that give a 
creditor extra protection if conditions deteriorate beyond a pre-determined threshold), 
and 
•  The improvement in methods of estimating the funding liquidity risk, by covering all 
the phases of the economic cycle. 
 
9.5 Other proposals 
•  A change in remuneration policies in the financial sector. Specifically, executive 
compensation in this sector should depend not only on short-term goals and annual 
                                                 
76 It is argued, that this ratio could have helped to prevent some bank failures (Banziger, 2009). 
See also Caprio, 2010, who suggests that capital adequacy should not be calculated as a function 
of risk. 
  41profits, but also on the risk involved
77 (IMF, 2009b and BCBS, 2010c). Already some 
banks use risk-adjustment methods for determining bonuses (such as the RAROC 
method, accounting methods, the degree of adaptation to the rules, etc.
78). However, 
the inclusion of risk for determining bonuses is expected to face difficulties in 
practice (Kashyap et al., 2008) for two reasons: First, risks are not necessarily known 
when the investment in a financial asset is made and therefore cannot easily be 
estimated accurately. Second, dealers can usually find ways to circumvent procedures 
and regulations. Note that in order to ensure that the attempt to change remuneration 
policy in the financial sector is successful, it should be accompanied by appropriate 
changes to the corporate governance of banks
79. It is also proposed to pay bonuses to 
supervisors, when financial stability is achieved for a considerable time, combined 
with an evaluation of the supervisor’s effectiveness by a qualified independent body 
(Goodhart and Persaud, 2008). 
•  An integrated approach to counterparty credit risk. This can be achieved by 
calculating capital requirements, reflecting periods of stress and the likelihood that 
either the counterparty’s credit rating decreases or the counterparty defaults. 
•  The creation of a crisis management framework for financial institutions. The last 
crisis reached its peak after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which shows how 
important this proposal is, particularly for systemically important institutions
80 (FSF, 
2009). For this reason, capital requirements should depend on the bank’s assets 
(Warrick Report, 2009), or additional capital could be required, according to each 
bank’s contribution in the overall systemic risk (see Section 9.2.2). 
                                                 
77 The FSF (2009b) presented nine (9) guidelines for the rationalization of remuneration policies 
in the financial sector. This issue also concerns the European Commission (see 
30.4.2009/384/EC), CEBS and the Financial Services Authority. The proposals refer to a 
maximum percentage of additional fees on top of the official wage, as well as a limit to bonuses 
paid directly. 
78 The methods of risk adjustment are usually announced in advance, but sometimes adjustments 
are made retrospectively - particularly when irregularities are identified on the part of the officer 
that is to receive a bonus (BCBS, 2010c). 
79 See BCBS (2010d) for guidelines concerning corporate governance. 
80 Not only too-big-to-fail banking institutions can affect financial stability. For this reason, the 
final decisions of the Basel Committee states that systemically important institutions should 
maintain a higher loss absorbing capacity (see Section 10.1). 
  42•  Reports of credit-rating agencies. The Eurosystem is aiming to improve the 
transparency of the methods used by these companies to ensure quality and reliability 
of their procedures and oversee their independence. In addition, these companies 
themselves have announced measures to improve their reliability (ECB, 2009d). 
•  Limit the Loan to Value (LTV) ratio: It has been found that a surge in property prices 
in OECD countries can lead to a crisis. To reduce the likelihood of a crisis in the 
banking sector, Barell et al. (2010) have proposed to put limits on LTV ratios in 
mortgage lending, when there are strong upward trends in property prices
81.  
 
10. Basel III and its implications 
10.1 Decisions concerning capital requirements, risk and liquidity 
In September 2010, the BCBS announced
82 its final decisions on a series of 
amendments to the Basel II framework so as to improve the quality and quantity of banks' 
capital, enhance liquidity, reduce bank’s tendency to take high risks and to dampen 
procyclicality (BCBS, 2010a). This new and comprehensive framework, is known as the 
Basel III framework. The new framework is to strengthen banks, so that they can absorb 
potential losses, and to reduce the possibility of (new) financial crises. The proposals of 
the new framework will be implemented gradually from 2013 until 2019. However, 
banks can make the necessary adjustments in advance (See BCBS, 2010a). More 
precisely: 
•  As regards capital, the Commission decided: 
First, to raise core Tier I Ratio
83 from 2% to 4.5% (Figure 1). 
Second, to increase minimum Tier I capital from 4% to 6%. 
                                                 
81 Borio et al. (2001) provide a description of LTV ratios used in several countries. 
82 The final document of Basel III was published in December 2010 (BCBS, 2010e) and has only 
a few changes from the July 2010 Agreements amongst the 26 (of 27) members of the Basel 
Committee. The main difference is the longer transition period (different for each proposal) for 
full implementation of the new capital rules, which may be due to the finding that a longer 
transition period is expected to cause less impact on GDP and loan supply by banks 
(Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG), 2010). 
83 Referred to also as minimum common equity capital ratio. 
  43Third, to impose stricter criteria on which financial instruments can be included in the 
Tier I capital requirement. 
•  As regards the leverage ratio, the decision was taken to test a minimum Tier I 
leverage ratio of 3% (non-risk-based) during the parallel run period, until its 
implementation on January 1
st 2018 (Figure 1). 
•  As regards more extensive risk coverage, the Committee decided to increase capital 
requirements for the banking and the trading portfolio and counterparty credit risk, 
while efforts are being made to reduce dependence on credit-rating agencies for 
determining capital requirements for credit risk. 
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Notes: - Core Tier I ratio includes Tier I ratio.   
            - Minimum Total Capital includes Core Tier I ratio. 
•  As regards liquidity, the Basel Committee decided to establish two liquidity ratios: 
-  The liquidity coverage ratio. This ratio is designed to ensure that a bank is able 
to meet its cash outflows during a crisis for 30 days; and 
  44-  The net stable funding ratio, as an additional long-term liquidity ratio
84 (its time 
horizon is one year). 
•  To address systemic risk, the Committee is moving towards a higher loss absorbing 
capacity (i.e. higher capital adequacy ratios), for systemically-important financial 
institutions. 
 
10.2 Decisions addressing procyclicality 
        As regards procyclicality, the Committee reached a group of decisions, aimed at: 
•  Mitigating the procyclicality of minimum capital requirements, by introducing a 
number of safeguards such as a longer period for calculating PD, downward LGD and 
basing their calculation on factors that cover the entire economic cycle
85. 
•  The promotion of dynamic provisioning, by supporting the proposals of the IASB
86. 
•  The introduction of the capital conservation buffer, which will be ultimately 
calibrated at 2.5% (Figure 1), and maintained by banks throughout the economic 
cycle, aiming to absorb losses on a major crisis. 
•  The introduction of the countercyclical buffer, which will be determined by national 
supervisory authorities, depending on the prevailing macroeconomic conditions 
(strong credit expansion) and can be calibrated within the 0-2.5% range, irrespective 
of the capital conservation buffer. 
 
10.2.1 Comments on the proposals concerning procyclicality 
The objective of the countercyclical buffer is to ensure the ability of the whole 
banking sector to provide loans to the economy during recessions (BCBS, 2010a) and to 
protect banks from taking significant risks in periods of excessive credit growth. The 
                                                 
84 The Committee has also decided to proceed to changes in the definitions of liquid assets, which 
are to be used to calculate these ratios. However, pending clarification of liquidity and leverage 
ratios, as well as the additional funds required by systemically important financial institutions. 
Moreover, at the end of 2011, increased capital requirements for the banks’ trading portfolio are 
expected to be announced (including positions in derivatives and securitisations) (BCBS, 2010a). 
85 This proposals resembles that of Gordy and Howells (2006), presented in Section 9.2.1. 
86 See Section 9.3. 
  45implementation of this buffer requires the selection of those factors (leading indicators) 
that will point to the large accumulation of risks, and when
87 and with what intensity this 
buffer should be used. The decision to implement the countercyclical buffer will be taken 
by each country’s supervisory authorities, based on the deviation in the ratio of bank 
loans to the country's GDP
88 from its trend (BCBS, 2010e and 2010f and Drehmann, 
2010). Banks will build the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer 
through retained earnings (BCBS, 2009), which are high quality capital (Tier I). Failure 
on the part of a bank to build these buffers will not affect its operation (in fact these 
buffers will be used in times of crisis), but the bank will not be allowed to distribute 
profits as dividends, engage in share buybacks, or discretionary payments to its staff
89. 
More generally, from the above suggestions of Basel III, we can say that: 
•  The countercyclical buffer is likely to be insufficient, because credit growth lags the 
economic cycle and because of the development of innovative financial products.  
•  The use of data from a longer time period in order to calculate PD is correct, but 
requires the optimization of weights for calculating risk weighted assets. 
•  The use of dynamic provisioning for the expected PDs of a portfolio is a move in the 
right direction. 
 
10.3 Assessing Basel’s III macroeconomic impact 
10.3.1 Basel’s III macroeconomic impact during the transition period 
Decisions about banks’ capital adequacy and liquidity ratios are expected to cause 
both positive and negative effects (BCBS, 2010b). Positive effects include the strength- 
                                                 
87  In order to determine the proper timing for the use of the countercyclical capital buffer, the use 
of indicators relating to the overall losses of the banking industry in conjunction with indicators 
on lending standards is proposed. The use of the countercyclical capital buffer should in general 
be immediate. 
88 This rate is the basic reference point, but it may be supplemented by other factors such as asset 
prices, yield spreads, credit default swaps, survey studies, the phase of the economic cycle and the 
possibility of misleading signals. 
89 The bank will have this possibility if allowed to increase its share capital, always after 
agreement with supervisors. 
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Table 1: Basel’s III macroeconomic impact during the transition period
 1
Mean yearly change (median
2) 
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6: 




















Implementation of Basel’s III 
main proposals
7: 
•  Euro area  
•  Euro zone, U.S.A.













1 The transitional period is set at 4.5 years from MAG (2010) and Sveriges Riksbank 
(2010) and 5 years from the Institute of International Finance (IIF, 2010). 
 
 
2 Median estimates across comparable studies. 
3 End of period. 
4 MAG (2010). Countries included: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Russia, Un. Kingdom and U.S.A. 
5 Sveriges Riksbank (2010). 
6 Ratio of liquid financial assets to total assets. 
7 IIF (2010). 
8 In the case of the U.S., the effect of specific factors of the credit system was also 
estimated. 
-ening of the financial sector
90, the reduced likelihood of a crisis and the relatively 
smaller impact on GDP when a crisis does arise. The negative effects include the increase 
in lending rates and the resulting decline in GDP, without however affecting its long-term 
trend. Specifically, it was estimated that during the transition period (4.5 years), a one 
percentage point increase in capital requirements (either in core Tier I or capital buffers) 
                                                 
90 However, this possibility is disputed (see VanHoose, 2006), since the capital adequacy 
framework can either lead banks to engage in riskier activities, or to attempt to avoid regulations 
(regulatory arbitrage) or to nonbanks (unregulated or less regulated non-banking financial 
institutions) taking over part of banks’ regulated activities (Caprio, 2010). 
 
  47Table 2: Basel’s III long-term economic impact
1
Mean yearly change (median
2) 
 
GDP (%)   Real cost of 
lending (in bps)  
Total lending 
(%) 
Increase in capital requirements by 
one percentage point: 
•  Euro area countries and eleven 
more countries
 3: 
-   (BCBS)
4 
-   (MAG)
5 




•  Euro area countries, American 

































Increase in liquid assets
10 by 25% 
•  Euro area countries and eleven 
more countries
 3, 5 




•  Euro area countries, American 























Application of Basel’s III main 
proposals
 12: 
•  Euro zone 
•  Euro zone, U.S.A. 













1 The transition period is included is set at 8 years by BCBS (2010β), MAG (2010) and 
Banca d’Italia (2010) and at 10 years by Barrell et al. (2009) και IIF (2010). 
2 Median estimates across comparable studies. 
3 Countries included: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Russia, Un. Kingdom and U.S.A. 
4 BCBS (2010β).  
5 MAG (2010). 
6 Barrell et al. (2009). 
7 Refers to decrese in total assets, not just total lending. 
8 Banca d’Italia (2010). 
9 Angelini et al. (2011). 
10 Ratio of liquid financial assets to total assets. 
11 Increase in liquid ratio by one percentage point. 
12 IIF (2010). 
13 In the case of the U.S., the effect of specific factors of the credit system was also 
estimated. 
  
  48in the euro area countries and in eleven additional countries, is expected to cause a 
reduction in GDP from its trend by 0.04% per annum, while a 25% increase in the ratio of 
liquid assets to total assets will reduce GDP from its trend by 0.02% per annum (Table 1). 
Additionally, these two factors will increase the real cost of lending by 15 basis points 
(bps) and 14 bps, respectively and reduce total lending at the end of this period by 1.4% 
and 3.2% respectively. In Sweden, it is estimated that these two factors will increase the 
real cost of lending by 9 bps and 14 bps respectively, while at the same time reduce total 
lending by 2.0% and 5.8% respectively (Table 1). Moreover, it is expected that the 
implementation of Basel’s III main proposals are expected to cause an average annual 
decline in GDP from its trend in the euro area by 0.9%, due to a 134 bps increase in the 
real cost of lending, while the decline in GDP in the U.S. and Japan is expected to be 
significantly lower (Table 1). 
 
10.3.2 Basel’s III long-term economic impact  
This period includes the transition period and covers 8 to 10 years. Table 2 shows 
that increasing capital requirements by one percentage point is expected to cause a 
reduction in GDP from it trend at the end of the period from 0.09% to 0.10% in the euro 
area countries and a group of other countries because of increased real cost of lending by 
7 bps. In the UK, the decline is expected at around 0.08%, due to an increased real cost of 
lending by 18 bps and a reduction in overall lending by 1.2%, while in Italy the decline in 
GDP is expected to reach 0.10%. Also, the increase in the ratio of liquid financial assets 
to total assets by 25% will lead to a decline in GDP from its trend in the euro area 
countries and a group of other countries by 0.08% and in Italy by 0.02% (Table 2). 
10.3.2 Basel’s III long-term economic impact. 
Moreover, it is estimated that the implementation of Basel’s III main proposals will 
result in a GDP being 4.4% below its trend in the euro area at the end of the period, due 
to increases in the cost of loans by 97 bps, while the drop in GDP is expected to be 
significantly less in the U.S. GDP and Japan (Table 2). Finally, the implementation of 
countercyclical buffer is expected to reduce the volatility of GDP. 
  49In general, it is estimated that the final net effect of the Basel’s III proposals is 
positive (BCBS, 2010b and Barell et al., 2010). 
 
11. Conclusions 
The recent crisis and the new decisions by the Basel Committee confirm that the 
banking industry’s procyclicality is now in the limelight, as it exacerbates the current 
phase of the economic cycle, through a process of mutual reinforcement, with direct 
consequences for both credit standards and banks’ viability and hence for financial 
stability. 
The literature attempts to examine the determinants of banks’ procyclical behaviour 
in credit. From the supply of loans side, the emphasis is mainly on the impact of banks' 
capital and economic activity. The literature examining the procyclicality on the demand 
side for bank loans, especially in times of economic crisis, is very limited. The number of 
studies attempting to distinguish the effect of the demand and supply of loans on 
economic activity is also limited. 
The impact of procyclicality is particularly important, since banks are transformed 
from mitigation mechanisms to amplifiers of changes in economic activity, fail to 
perform properly their role as mechanisms for allocating resources efficiently within the 
economy, while the viability of individual banks and thus financial stability is hampered. 
In the literature, there is a clear understanding about the causes of procyclicality. 
Procyclicality is an inherent feature of the banking sector and its causes can be found in 
deviations from the efficient market hypothesis. However, this study proceeded to 
separate the causes of procyclicality from the factors that can attenuate or intensify it. 
These factors include the monetary and fiscal policy, the regulatory and supervisory 
framework, and the practices of banks and other companies in the financial sector, such 
as remuneration policies, credit rating agencies reports, etc. The theoretical and empirical 
literature about the contribution of Basel I and II to the procyclicality of the banking 
system is extensive. Although some theoretical studies suggest that Basel II does not 
exacerbate procyclicality, the majority of the empirical literature agrees that Basel II does 
  50amplify procyclicality. Although not all Basel II’s recommendations were followed, it is 
estimated that the criticism about the role of Basel II to amplify procyclicality in the 
banking sector, is well-founded. However, it may be the case that this criticism 
underestimates, to a large extent, the contribution of this framework towards the direction 
of effective risk management in the banking sector and its role in financial stability. 
Finally, it is estimated that accounting rules can cause increased variability in banks’ 
financial statements and delay the recognition of losses in loan portfolios, leading to an 
exacerbation of procyclicality. 
Before the current crisis, but especially after its ignition, a series of proposals to 
dampen the banking sector’s tendency to procyclicality were presented. These proposals 
are divided into those relating to general rules for the whole banking industry (rules) and 
those related to individual banks or countries (discretion). Some of these proposals have 
been adopted in the new Basel III framework, and they seem able to address the 
procyclicality issue. However, these proposals will lead to higher minimum capital 
adequacy ratios, which are expected to affect lending costs, the provision of loans by 
banks, and, hence, economic activity. But, the cost of the new proposals is expected to be 
lower than the cost of potential financial crises, if the proposals are not implemented. 
In any case, the efforts to mitigate banking industry’s procyclicality require a 
concerted effort from many sides. The analysis in this paper has shown that procyclicality 
is influenced by many aspects of the economic environment as well as financial sector 
practices, which makes it difficult to deal with it effectively. Consequently, efforts to 
attenuate procyclicality in the banking industry pose a risk of failure. 
It is estimated that future research could focus on developing models to explain the 
phenomenon of procyclicality on the side of the relationship between economic activity 
and the banking system and to assess the impact of the Basel’s III proposals for 
procyclicality alone. 
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